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THE MAKING OF FILÁRTIGA V. PEÑA:
THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT
AFTER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS
Editor’s Note: On June 30, 1980, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decided Filártiga v. Peña-Irala,1 a groundbreaking case that
used the Alien Tort Claims Act to achieve justice for victims of in-
ternational human rights violations.  The twenty-fifth anniversary
of the Second Circuit Filártiga decision was celebrated on Novem-
ber 2, 2005 by the International Law Committee of the Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, the Center for Constitutional
Rights (CCR), and the New York City Law Review with “The Making
of Filártiga v. Peña: Alien Tort Claims Act After Twenty-Five Years”
at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.  Starting the
discussion was Sidney Rosdeitcher, Chair of the City Bar Associa-
tion’s Civil Rights Committee.  Moderating the discussion was Fel-
ice Gaer, Director of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the
Advancement of Human Rights and Expert Member of the U.N.
Committee Against Torture.  The panelists were John Huerta, Gen-
eral Counsel at The Smithsonian Institution and former Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for Human Rights at the Department of
Justice (DOJ); Peter Weiss, Vice-President of the Center for Consti-
tutional Rights (CCR) and counsel for the Filártiga plaintiffs; and
Rhonda Copelon, Professor of Law and Director of the Interna-
tional Women’s Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University of
New York School of Law and former CCR staff attorney and coun-
sel for Filártiga plaintiffs.  Concluding remarks were given by Ralph
Steinhardt, Professor of Law and International Affairs and Arthur
Selwyn Miller Research Professor of Law at The Elliot School of
International Affairs at George Washington University, and Sandra
Coliver, Executive Director of the Center for Justice and Accounta-
bility.  Last but not least, Filártiga plaintiffs Dr. Joel Filártiga and
Dolly Filártiga were present.  Scheduled panelists Patricia M. Der-
ian, former Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Hu-
manitarian Affairs, and Robert White, President of Center for
International Policy and former U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay and
El Salvador, were unable to attend because of separate emergen-
cies, but the latter submitted comments, which are printed below.
SIDNEY ROSDEITCHER: It’s my pleasure to welcome you this eve-
ning to a program on Filártiga after twenty-five years. It seems very
1 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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fitting to have this panel this year, looking back on the last few
years and some of the infamous memos we have seen about tor-
ture.  It is quite refreshing to read the Filártiga claim and see the
simple proposition that torture violates the laws of nations.
It is my special pleasure to welcome Dr. Joel Filártiga and
Dolly Filártiga, the two plaintiffs who brought this case and are re-
sponsible for the ground-breaking decision. I think we owe them a
great debt.  Mankind owes them a great debt.
It is now my privilege to introduce the extraordinary modera-
tor for this extraordinary panel, Felice Gaer.  Ms. Gaer is currently
director of the Jacob Blaustein Institute for the Advancement of
Human Rights of the American Jewish Committee.  She is past
chair and current vice chair of the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom and is now serving her second
term as an expert member of the United Nations Committee
Against Torture.  Ms. Gaer has a long record as a human rights
leader and activist:  She serves on the steering committee of
Human Rights Watch for Europe and Central Asia and on the
Board of Directors of the Andrei Sakharov Foundation; she is Vice
President of the International League of Human Rights.  It is
therefore my pleasure to turn the evening over to the good hands
of Felice Gaer.
FELICE GAER: Thank you Sydney, and thank you all for joining
us today for what I am sure will be both a historic review and a
historic look forward.  We are going to proceed in a forum that is
more or less a roundtable discussion as we look back at the Filártiga
case. This is an extraordinarily important case: No one would have
known in 1976, when the [President Alfredo] Stroessner regime in
Paraguay was in its twentieth year, that the murder of Joelito Filár-
tiga would not only change the political dynamics in Paraguay, but
it would also change the dynamic in the United States and globally
for victims of torture and universal crimes of that nature.
Behind me are some photographs.  One of the things that
made this case so important was the fact that Dr. Joel Filártiga him-
self took these photographs. Another thing that was vitally impor-
tant was that Dolly Filártiga herself was called by the neighbor in
the house where Joelito was allegedly killed and told to take her
brother’s body back. And she did. They carried it back.
MS. GAER: So this case begins with witnesses, documentation,
and a background of years of repression through which people had
become attuned to this type of situation.  Without elaborating on
what else went on—because I want those who were there to be able
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to tell us what happened—I’ll simply point out that there was a lot
of activity.  A great number of human rights organizations and in-
dividuals began to draw attention to this killing and to what didn’t
make sense about it.  Joelito’s death was being called a crime of
passion by the government and its officials.  Yet evidence made
clear that there had been systematic torture by very professional
torturers, although this could be seen only by people with forensic
knowledge. Dr. Filártiga, himself a torture victim, could spot the
evidence on his son’s body immediately, and he was able to docu-
ment it and bring it to the attention of others.  Although a cover-
up followed, the human rights movement didn’t let that cover-up
stay there as if it was the reality.  And what happened thereafter is
really for our panelists to tell you.
Now, among our panelists today are Peter Weiss and Rhonda
Copelon, both of whom were at the Center for Constitutional
Rights and had dabbled with the question of whether the Alien
Tort Claims Act, an ancient American one-sentence-long law, could
be invoked in the courts.  Peter—who is the Vice President of the
Center for Constitutional Rights and is well known to everyone for
his extraordinary civil liberties work and his work on this case—
Peter, could you tell us what led you to bring human rights and the
Filártiga case forward in this way? You were one of the architects in
this case; how did it actually come about? Why did you pick this
approach in this case?
PETER WEISS: Thank you, Felice.  Since this part of the pro-
gram is historical, I’ll start briefly at the beginning.  Around 1967,
we invited a young journalist named Seymour Hersh, who had just
written his first book on chemical and biological weapons,2 to the
Center for Constitutional Rights.  He gave us a very interesting lec-
ture, and then at five minutes to six he said, “I’ve got to get going.”
We asked, “Where are you going?” and he said, “I’m going down to
Fort Benning to find the guy who committed the massacre at My
Lai.”  And as you know, he won the Pulitzer Prize for his book
about My Lai.3  Our initial connections with Sy led us to begin to
think about what we could do to bring to justice the people who
were really responsible for the massacre.
During the course of that investigation we discovered this an-
2 SEYMOUR M. HERSH, CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE: AMERICA’S HIDDEN AR-
SENAL (1968).
3 See David Carr, Dogged Reporter’s Impact, from My Lai to Abu Ghraib, N.Y. TIMES,
May 20, 2004, at E4; SEYMOUR M. HERSH, MY LAI FOUR: A REPORT ON THE MASSACRE
AND ITS AFTERMATH (1970).
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cient one-sentence law: the Alien Tort Claims Act, or Alien Tort
Statute, as some people are calling it now.  It is so short I’ll give you
the exact text of it. It says, “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”4
We started to develop a case regarding My Lai, but eventually the
Vietnamese government decided they didn’t want to be in an
American court in the middle of the war.
Then, almost ten years later, I was sitting at my desk in my law
office, and I got a call from Gerhard Elston at Amnesty Interna-
tional.  Gerhard said, “There is a notorious torturer sitting in the
INS detention center at the former Brooklyn Navy Yard in Brook-
lyn.  You’ve got to keep him here and bring him to justice.”  I said,
“How are we going to do that?” He replied, “That’s your problem,”
and he hung up.  Of course, that torturer was [Americo Norberto]
Peña-Irala.
So, we called an emergency meeting at the Center and de-
cided that it was time to use the Alien Tort Claims Act.  I have to
tell you it was very hard to convince the staff at the Center that it
made any sense to sue a Paraguayan citizen in the United States on
behalf of two Paraguayan citizens for an act committed in Para-
guay.  Fortunately, I had Rhonda there at the meeting, who was
then a staff attorney and a crackerjack litigator for the Center. I
think her enthusiasm swayed the decision, and we decided to bring
Dolly to New York with her Washington lawyer Michael Maggio,
who was just recently out of law school and also played an impor-
tant role at that time, but is unfortunately out of town today.  We
decided to bring this case immediately because we had ascertained
that Peña-Irala was under an order of deportation and might be
put on a plane by the INS within forty-eight hours.  We worked
most of the night and finished the papers by Friday afternoon at
four o’clock.  We were determined to serve them by five o’clock on
Friday at the Eastern District. Then there was the famous taxi ride
that Rhonda took with Michael to file the complaint at the Eastern
District, and you know what New York traffic is like on a Friday
afternoon.  I’m told that Rhonda kept saying, “We should have
taken the subway.  We should have taken the subway.”   We got
there at five minutes to five, and we filed the complaint, and the
next day we served Peña-Irala and his companion Juana Villalba at
the INS center.
The following Monday we were in court in the Eastern District
4 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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of New York.  We drew Judge Eugene Nickerson.  We were very
happy about that because he had a wonderful reputation, and in-
deed he was very interested in the case.  At the preliminary hear-
ing, we asked him for an order keeping Peña-Irala and his
girlfriend in the country for the trial, and he issued that order.  I
remember very clearly as he walked off the bench toward his cham-
bers, he turned around and he said, “Interesting case.” Well, that
was the beginning.
Then we did a certain amount of very feverish research be-
cause, up to that point, the Alien Tort Claims Act had been basi-
cally dormant for 200 years.  There was one case in the Second
Circuit, Dreyfus v. Von Finck, which was brought by a German refu-
gee against a German bank that had opened an office in New York
and which had been used by the Nazis to expropriate the plaintiff’s
bank account.5  Judge [Van Graafeiland], who was on the Second
Circuit at that time, dismissed that case with some very bad lan-
guage about international law, saying basically that international
law governs only relations between states and has very little to do
with individuals.6  That was the issue that we had to focus on.
We dug up a lot of stuff from the early past making the point
that international law started as the law governing relations be-
tween states, but was now increasingly becoming of concern to rela-
tionships between individuals and states.  We did not manage to
convince Judge Nickerson at that point; he was rather unhappy
about that.  He felt that he was bound by the precedent of the Drey-
fus case.  It was clear that he would have preferred to rule for us.
Then we appealed to the Second Circuit.  When I was about
two minutes into my argument Judge Kaufman interrupted me and
asked, “Mr. Weiss, what does the State Department think of this
case?”  I sort of said to myself, under my breath, “When I went to
law school I was told that judges were to act independently of the
government, and that was what an independent judiciary was
about.”  I didn’t actually tell him that though.  But he listened to
the argument, and then within minutes after the argument was
over he instructed his clerk to obtain the opinion of the State
Department.
MS. GAER: Rhonda Copelon was a staff attorney at the Center
5 534 F.2d 24, 26 (2d Cir. 1976).
6 Id. at 30–31 (“There has been little judicial interpretation of what constitutes
the law of nations and no universally accepted definition of this phrase.  There is a
general consensus, however, that it deals primarily with the relationship among na-
tions rather than among individuals.”) (citations omitted).
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for Constitutional Rights.  Today she is Professor of Law at the City
University of New York School of Law and Director of the Interna-
tional Women’s Human Rights Clinic.  Rhonda, when Peter called
you, we understand you were the one who was most supportive of
using the Alien Tort Claims Act.  This was the first case where a
federal court stopped a deportation. There were a lot of issues that
were new, including this request to the State Department.  Could
you tell us a little bit about what your expectations were when you
started this; when you said, “Let’s try to implement this 200-year-
old statute?”  How did the case develop after that?
PROFESSOR RHONDA COPELON: Thank you. Greetings every-
body. I just want to say that I don’t remember it being such a con-
troversy at CCR at the time, but that may have been because I was
so busy.  I had no time for a controversy, and maybe Peter was
more aware of it.
The crazy thing was—I say this to law students, but I am a little
reluctant to say this at the Bar Association—it seemed very simple.
That statute was very simple.7  We had an alien, although I don’t
like using that word; we had a tort.  So it seemed to center on the
issue, “Is torture a violation of the law of nations?”  I was not an
international lawyer at that time, and I considered that this was
Peter’s department.  He said to me it was, and I said, “Okay.”  So it
seemed like an immensely simple case.
For all of those who have been working on this since 1979
when we started the case, obviously it was not simple at all. I think
that is an interesting part of the story:  Peter talked about the point
that the concept of international law was a pre-Nuremberg, pre-
U.N. Charter concept.  Before Filártiga, it was the idea that the law
of nations was about the relationship between states and was not
about people.  I remember when Peter and I developed argu-
ments, we dug up very strong material dating back from the begin-
ning of this country, stating that international customary law is an
evolving law, it doesn’t get stuck in one time, and it keeps moving.
The other concept ignored by the court in Dreyfus was that
international law was about things that countries felt were needed
or useful to the common good.  Judge [Van Graafeiland] didn’t
notice this piece of the standard that had been articulated.  I re-
member one afternoon thinking about the question—and this is
common:  You are sure you are going to be asked a question, and
7 § 1350 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by
an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States.”).
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you spend a lot of time trying to figure out an answer to it, and
then you are never actually asked the question—“How do we show
the court in a pragmatic way that what a state does to its own peo-
ple is about relations between states?”  This matters to interna-
tional law, and even beyond that it matters that people treat their
own people correctly.  That is the common good, right?  So we had
this discussion, and I remember talking about how these violations
create massive refugee problems in war, and that you cannot really
talk about even having peace between countries when you have
these kind of internal problems.  In the end, we were never asked
that question in court.
It is also important that this case came up before Rule 11 sanc-
tions became more common.8  When I went to the circuit to have a
meeting with counsel, the judge said to me, “What are you doing
here with a case that involves Paraguayans and happened in Para-
guay and just happens to have a person living here in this country?”
I said, “Well, look at the statute.  We meet the terms.”  He said, “I
think I should just dismiss this case, or can you settle this case?”
And I said, “No.  There is no way to do that.”  I walked out very
confident that we had a very strong case knowing that it was the
first time we really had in fact brought such a case.  Had the use of
Rule 11 been as common at the time as it is today, I think that
there would have been a lot more reluctance about whether or not
to take the risk of bringing a case like this, which illustrates how
Rule 11 can block creative litigation.
What happened when we got to the circuit level is that the
case got more complicated.  It got more complicated in ways that
Ralph Steinhardt, who represented [Humberto] Alvarez-Machain
in the Sosa case two years ago before the Supreme Court,9 will later
explain.  As opposed to Stroessner’s “mob lawyer” who came out to
handle the case at the district court level, a very well-respected New
Jersey firm10 came in at the circuit level and they raised constitu-
tional issues.
First, when they raised the constitutional issues I said, “What is
the issue?”  The issue, it turns out, was that under Article III of the
Constitution—which gives the courts the power to hear cases in-
8 Fed R. Civ. P. 11 (2000).  Rule 11 provides for monetary and nonmonetary sanc-
tions for, among other things, claims and defenses that are not “warranted by existing
law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of ex-
isting law or the establishment of new law.” Id. § (b)(2).
9 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004); see infra comments of Ralph
Steinhardt.
10 Lowenstein, Sandler, Brochin, Kohl, Fisher & Boylan, P. C.
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volving the constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States—
what is federal common law?  Is federal common law something
within the jurisdiction of the courts?  Because if it is not, the Alien
Tort Claims Act is, as in Marbury v. Madison,11 against the Constitu-
tion.  And that issue, it seems to me, haunted this whole case until
the Supreme Court took it up twenty-four years later in Sosa, an-
swering, “Yes, federal common law is part of the laws of the United
States.”12
Also, I would say this about the request for the State Depart-
ment brief: I think Judge Kaufman asked for it five or six times
during the argument, and when we got back to the office, his clerk
had called us to tell us the court had asked for the brief; and we
said to ourselves, “That brief is going to determine this case.”  We
knew there was a big fight that was going to take place within the
State Department about how to come out on this case—but we did
not know how they would come out, and it was truly a cliffhanger.
Also, a comment about the judges.  There were three judges to
begin with: Chief Judge Irving Kaufman, Judge Smith, and Judge
Feinberg.  Judge Smith seemed very clear at the argument that he
understood this was a tort.  He understood that this tort could be
heard at the state court, and if we didn’t want these things to be
heard in the state court, the Alien Tort Claims Act existed to have
them be heard in federal court.  Judge Feinberg seemed sympa-
thetic.  Judge Kaufman seemed hostile.13  Sadly, Judge Smith died
before the case was decided.  Judge Amalya Kearse, a new ap-
pointee by the Nixon Administration, was then appointed to the
case.
We are going to turn now to look at what happened at the
State Department, but I just wanted to add that I think that was
11 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803). (“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is. . . .  [I]f a law be in opposition to the
[C]onstitution, . . . the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.”).
12 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729–30.
13 In an article five months after his decision, however, Judge Kaufman wrote that
Filártiga “breaks new ground in the body of law governing torture.”  Irving R. Kauf-
man, A Legal Remedy for International Torture?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 1980, at 44.
Americans are reluctant to interfere in overseas disputes between two
foreign nationals. But where torture is involved, on the state or interna-
tional level, the Federal courts have no choice. The articulation of set-
tled norms of international law by the Federal courts, much like their
adherence to constitutional precepts, is an expression of this nation’s
commitment to the preservation of fundamental elements of human
dignity throughout the world.
Id. at 52.
2006] ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT AFTER 25 YEARS 257
very determinative of the outcome of the case, including the unani-
mous decision.  I think the fact that it was a unanimous decision
has meant that a lowly circuit decision lasted around the country,
laying the foundation for cases all over the country for twenty-four
years before the issue went to the Supreme Court.
MS. GAER: Earlier, we spoke to both Ambassador Bob White
and Patricia Derian, who was Assistant Secretary of State for
Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs at the time.  The State
Department was engaged on two different levels in this case.  First
there was the simple question of how was it that Mr. Peña got into
the U.S., Peña being the torturer who was responsible for the death
of Joel Filártiga.  Who gave him the visa and why?  Peña came to
the U.S. on a tourist visa, saying he was going to Disney World, but
the facts later showed that he sold his house and his car in Para-
guay before he left.  And there was another question: Who in the
Embassy gave him the visa?  What kind of application was there?
What kind of investigation was there?
To a large extent, this case made an issue—for one of the first
times in America, I think—of the process for issuing visas and the
responsibility of U.S. consular officials for providing them to peo-
ple with dubious backgrounds and charges against them.  They
later said there were no charges against Peña in Paraguay, but that
conclusion depends on how you interpret Paraguayan law.  There
was a back-and-forth about the visa question within the State De-
partment—between the Regional Bureau and the Human Rights
Bureau—and with the Embassy and its consulate.  The Department
of State took guidance from the Embassy as to what to say and how
to say it.  At the same time, the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee was recommending a cut-off of economic and military aid to
Paraguay.  So the State Department’s involvement was becoming a
live issue.
On the matter of the amicus brief, we learned something
about large bureaucracies.  Patt Derian told us that they didn’t tell
her that they were preparing an amicus brief; she only found out
about it indirectly. They were trying to keep this from the Human
Rights Bureau presumably—and this is my assumption—in order
to prevent an outcome that would be favorable to human rights
and unfavorable to their view of the case.  So there were a lot of
currents pulling in different directions.  One of Patt Derian’s depu-
ties was actually taken and questioned for three hours before the
Inspector General in the State Department in order to find out if
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the Human Rights Bureau had leaked information about anything
related to the visa, the case, the amicus brief, and so forth.
ROBERT WHITE:14  Lying came as naturally to officials of the
Stroessner regime as cheating to card sharks.  The official propa-
ganda apparatus had quickly portrayed Lt. Colonel Americo Peña
as the wronged husband who killed Joelito in a jealous and right-
eous rage.
Evil systems are often fatally weakened by the courageous act
of one person: Rosa Parks in Alabama;15 Nelson Mandela in South
Africa;16 Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in Nicaragua;17 and Jose Filár-
tiga in Paraguay.  When the tortured body of Joelito Filártiga was
put on display for all to see, Paraguayan citizens waited for the
Stroessner regime to eliminate Dr. Filártiga.18  The usual four men,
dressed as civilians arriving in a gray Ford Falcon would take him
away, and he would never be heard from again.
Dictatorships do not know how to handle courage.  They are
particularly helpless when the man of courage has had the fore-
sight to establish himself nationally and internationally as a de-
fender of the human rights of workers, campesinos, and the
environment.  The Stroessner regime, in full view of the
Paraguayan people, crumbled.19  One man had faced them down,
and the Paraguayan dictator and his official thugs would never re-
cover.  The regime would not fall for several years, but the count-
down had begun.
Over the course of his forty-year presidency, General Stroess-
ner would often publicly refer to the American ambassador as “just
another member of my cabinet.”  He never said that about me.
When an official of the regime told me that I had to have the Filár-
tiga case thrown out of court or else no governmental minister
could ever safely visit the United States again, I told him that was
precisely the intent of the case and that if the Stroessner govern-
14 Ambassador White was unable to attend the panel but submitted comments
afterwards.
15 Ms. Parks was a civil rights activist famous for her refusal to give up her seat on a
bus to a white passenger in 1955.  Michael Janofsky, Thousands Gather at the Capitol to
Remember a Hero, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2005, at A16.
16 Mr. Mandela was an anti-apartheid activist, the first democratically-elected presi-
dent of South Africa, and the winner of a Nobel Peace Prize in 1993.  John Darnton,
Note of Unity Pervades Peace Prize Ceremony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1993, at A7.
17 Mr. Chamorro was a vocal opponent of the Somoza family rule in Nicaragua.
Somoza Refuses Demands for His Resignation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 1978, at A5.
18 Alfredo Stroessner was the president of Paraguay from 1954 to 1989. Paraguay
General Leads a Rebellion, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1989, at A9.
19 On February 2, 1989, rebel army units arrested Stroessner in Paraguay. Id.
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ment did not change its ways, its officials did not deserve to visit a
country where laws and human rights were respected.
United States law gives total discretion to the consular officer
to grant or withhold a visa.20  The most crucial question the consu-
lar official must decide is whether the applicant for a non-immi-
grant visa will return to his or her country; if the applicant will, the
visa is granted.21  An official of a foreign government would almost
automatically be issued a non-immigrant visa because his office
would establish his bona fides.22  The embassy, of course, would
have no way to know about actions that contradict an intent to re-
main, like the sale of a house and car.  There never has been, nor
are there now, resources to investigate non-immigrant visa appli-
cants to this extent.
I believe that today Americo Peña would not have received a
visa.  There is now a human rights officer in every embassy who,
inter alia, keeps up to date on pending human rights cases.  Most
career ambassadors today would impress on the chief of the consu-
lar section the need to keep informed about any visa cases with a
human rights component.
That being said, I believe our present law still gives too much
authority to one official and that some institutional check on a con-
sular officer would be desirable, particularly in countries where
human rights violation by government officials are routine.
MS. GAER:  Now, enter the Department of Justice.  We are very
pleased to have here tonight Jack Huerta, who is currently General
Counsel to the Smithsonian Institution and has an illustrious back-
ground in civil liberties litigation. At the time of the Filártiga case,
he was the Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights in the
Department of Justice. The amicus brief was submitted jointly by
the Department of State’s legal advisor and the Department of Jus-
tice.  My question for John is:  Why do you feel that the DOJ Civil
Rights Division was brought in and involved in this kind of interna-
tional case?  Was there a conflict within the DOJ about its involve-
20 8 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2006), Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
§ 221(a)(1).
21 See  8 U.S.C. § 1184(b), INA § 214(b) (“Every alien shall be presumed to be an
immigrant until he establishes to the satisfaction of the consular officer, at the time of
application for a visa, . . . that he is entitled to a non-immigrant status . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)).
22 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A)(i),(ii), INA § 101(a)(15)(A)(i),(ii) (including
within the definition of “nonimmigrants”—those who intend to return to their coun-
try of origin—ambassadors, public ministers, diplomats, and consular and other offi-
cials from countries recognized by the United States).
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ment and what position to take? If so, how did you develop that
position? Finally, was there a conflict with the State Department?
JOHN HUERTA: Let me start this out with a disclaimer, which is
that this all happened twenty-five years ago.  I have no access to my
files, which I left at the DOJ, so this is an old memory.  I will do the
best I can in terms of my recollections.  Since Rhonda called me, I
have been thinking a lot about different conversations, and every
day something new occurs to me.
As probably everyone here is aware, shortly after Jimmy Carter
became President, he made a presentation to the United Nations
about the importance of human rights to his presidency.23  We, be-
ing good bureaucrats in the DOJ, figured we had to do something
about international human rights, since that was an issue he was
concerned about.  Once he named Patt Derian as Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Human Rights, we set out to think about com-
plaints lodged against the United States, such as those from the
black community—like the Wilmington Ten24—from the Latino
community involving police brutality, and from the southwestern
Native American community of the Dakotas—Sioux Indians25—as
violations of human rights.  Where we could in those areas, we set
up units to investigate and bring prosecutions.  Some of them were
successful, although some of them didn’t get very far in terms of
the investigations.  So the Department already had this system in
place.
After the State Department received the letter, the way this
probably would have happened is that they would have referred it
to the Justice Department because the State Department can’t ap-
pear in court without the Justice Department representing them.
The letter would have gone to the Associate Attorney General.
The DOJ is divided so that there is a Deputy Attorney General in
charge of all the criminal matters and an Associate Attorney Gen-
eral who deals with all the civil litigation.
The reason why it went to the Civil Rights Division is because
we had previously interfaced with Barbara Babcock, who was the
Assistant Attorney General at the time. We had a very close working
23 Bernard Gwertzman, Carter Urges U.N. to Step Up Efforts for Human Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 18, 1977, at A1.
24 See Chavis v. North Carolina, 637 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir. 1980) (overturning the
Wilmington Ten’s convictions for allegedly firebombing a grocery store and assault-
ing the firemen who responded).
25 See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 390 (1980) (ordering
the federal government to pay $17.1 million plus interest dating back to 1877 to eight
tribes of Sioux Indians for lands illegally seized by the government).
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relationship with her in Civil Rights and had discussed how to han-
dle international human rights issues in the past.  She had agreed
in advance that the Civil Rights Division would have the lead since
we had the strength in terms of domestic civil rights issues.  So it
came over to us and my boss referred it to me.  The final memoran-
dum that was submitted to the court was edited in the Civil Rights
Division by Irving Gornstein, who did a terrific job, and Brian
Landsberg.26  We interfaced with the Legal Adviser and the Deputy
Legal Adviser at the State Department and especially with Stefan
Riesenfeld, a professor at Berkeley who had a very strong interest
in human rights who was on leave from Boalt Hall to the State
Department during the Carter administration.
I knew there was a strong debate within the State Department
on this issue. However, there really was not in the Department of
Justice.  Folks came together pretty well on it.  There was a lot of
internal coordination with the Legal Adviser’s office and with the
Solicitor’s office, but folks were pretty progressive on this issue.
Still, there were some issues that I can’t really recall, but they
weren’t so significant that there was a question of whether to re-
spond to the court or not.  First of all, I remember reading the
statute from 178927 and being shocked that there was no litigation
under this thing and asking: What was it designed to do?  I called
Rhonda and said, “What is this all about?”  We developed a phone
relationship over probably three or four months—although we met
in person today for the first time—while this thing was being devel-
oped and everything was coming together.  Overall, I was unaware
of internal politics at the State Department.
MS. GAER: The amicus brief was rather simple.  It addressed
two questions.  The first, “Is torture a violation of the law of na-
tions?” And second, “Does it give rise to judicially enforceable rem-
edies—is it a tort within the meaning of the Act?”28  The State
Department/Justice Department response to this is a model re-
sponse on these issues, and it would be nice to see the same things
reaffirmed right now.  They were unequivocal.  This was
1979–1980, before the Convention Against Torture29 was adopted
and before there was a binding international treaty that the U.S.
26 Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants,
Filártiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (No. 191, Docket 79-6090), at 26,
1980 WL 340146.
27 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
28 Memorandum for the United States, supra note 17, at i.
29 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/46 (Dec. 10, 1984).
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had signed and ratified. The amicus brief came out saying the dis-
trict court was wrong,30 and, indeed, when the appeals decision
came down, it was unanimous.31  They got it right.  I wonder if we
could return to that decision and to the following stage, which was
the suit for damages.  Rhonda, I want to ask you: Were you sur-
prised by the decision?  Throughout this case, Mr. Peña had an
attorney provided and paid for by the government of Paraguay,
and at a certain point—when they felt that the case was lost or that
no one would pay the attorney—there was a default.32  So when
you asked the court for a default judgment later on, were you sur-
prised by the decision?  When the issue of punitive damages came
up, how did that develop?  How do you see this case as important
to the subsequent work you have done in the area of international
women’s human rights, where you do so much work?  Has Filártiga
been an important development?
PROFESSOR COPELON: I think I was surprised by everything.  I
was immensely relieved.  I have to admit that this decision came
down on the same day as the decision in Harris v. McRae, involving
Medicaid funding for abortion.33  I had argued that case in front of
the Supreme Court, and it was the biggest loss of my life—and then
this case was the biggest victory.  It was hard to juggle those two
things on the same day, but it did open up the idea that interna-
tional human rights had something to do with what happens in the
United States.  We had actually filed a brief in the Medicaid abor-
tion case for rehearing using a case from the European Court of
Human Rights—that where there is a right there ought to be sup-
port in the exercise of that right—and although the Court didn’t
agree with that, it felt better to do it that way.34
I think that the fact that the court in Filártiga reaffirmed the
really old principle that international law is automatically part of
our law in the U.S.—that customary international law is part of our
federal common law—is extremely important not only to the Alien
30 Memorandum for the United States, supra note 26, at 12.
31 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
32 Peña defaulted after he lost in the Second Circuit. See Filartiga v. Peña-Irala,
577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
33 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980) (holding that the Hyde Amend-
ment, which denied federal Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions, vio-
lated neither the First Amendment nor the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process or Equal
Protection Clauses).  “The financial constraints that restrict an indigent woman’s abil-
ity to enjoy the full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice are the
product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her
indigency.” Id. at 316.
34 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 917, 917 (1980) (denying rehearing).
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Tort Claims Act,35 but also to the whole notion that international
human rights—whether we ratify a treaty or not—is part of our
law.36  It is part of our law in this country whether or not we see it
properly implemented by the Supreme Court.  And I think it was
easier for a court to reaffirm in a case that involved something
done by another sovereignty as opposed to something done by the
United States.  Therefore, I think there are so many ramifications
stemming from the amazing decision in Filártiga.
On the question of damages when we went back to the District
Court, I would say that Judge Nickerson was pretty glad that he had
been reversed, but he sent us to a magistrate for the hearing.  We
had some major goals in that hearing.  One goal was to give the
plaintiffs an opportunity to tell their story—and it’s a very painful
thing, a very painful opportunity.  The second goal was to have the
court recognize the necessity for punitive damages in a case such as
this.  At the hearing before the magistrate, in order to demonstrate
the importance of punitive damages, we called Ambassador Bob
White, and he told a story that I think really made clear the deter-
rent effect of the case: After the case had been filed, a couple of
Stroessner’s henchmen came to him and said, “Well, my God, can’t
you stop this?  You have to do something about this!  This case has
to be thrown out!  We’re not going to be able to go visit the United
States anymore.”  I think that had an impact to show the court:
“What is this about anyway?  Why should we be doing these cases
here?”
The other person who testified, in addition to the plaintiffs,
was Jacobo Timerman, who had written the book Prisoner Without a
Name, Cell Without a Number.37  The purpose of that testimony was
to demonstrate that, for the family of a torture victim, there is a
life-long, very complex, very everyday process of anguish and suffer-
ing and survival.  Timerman told stories about how he couldn’t so-
cialize with people because he felt that every time someone asked
him how he felt, he was being interrogated.  He made the issue of
torture and the stress of torture very concrete, as did Dolly and Dr.
Filártiga when they testified.
What happened? The magistrate issued an opinion providing
them with about $175,000 worth of compensatory damages and
35 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
36 Filártiga,  630 F.2d at 887.
37 JACOBO TIMERMAN, PRISONER WITHOUT A NAME, CELL WITHOUT A NUMBER (Toby
Talbot trans., Univ. of Wis. Press 2002) (1981). Timerman was editor and publisher of
La Opinión, an Argentinian newspaper critical of the government; he wrote of being
arrested and tortured in 1977.
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said that he didn’t think punitive damages were appropriate.38  We
looked at that and we said, “This is not a traffic accident.  This is
not a simple assault-and-battery.”  So we went back to Judge Nicker-
son and argued that he should add punitive damages.
We did not find a huge amount of support in international
law.  There were a few arbitral decisions. You could pull out the
concept of punishment here and there, but this was different from
what had come up previously in the context of the arbitral deci-
sions and in the context of international law.  Fortunately, you can
read the outcome for yourself.  It’s the second district court opin-
ion available on Westlaw and Lexis.39
Judge Nickerson understood that in order to vindicate the
gravity of torture under international law, you had to utilize puni-
tive damages, and so he added what at that time seemed enormous,
but today does not.  He added $5 million per plaintiff for punitive
damages.40  I think that that was another very important piece of
what Filártiga generated for future cases, which is the accepted pre-
mise that these kinds of acts—whether decided under interna-
tional law or our federal common law—require a very significant
punitive award.  And this was not a jury trial at that point; we did
this before the judge.
I will very quickly comment on the case’s impact on my future
work. Dolly was here with us the whole time and worked very
closely with us.  Dr. Filártiga came from time-to-time for a variety of
reasons to pursue the case.  I learned through my relationship with
Dolly something about what it means to survive torture, although
of course I don’t  really know because it didn’t happen to me.
More recently I have become very involved in issues of sexual vio-
lence against women in the wars in the former Yugoslavia and
Haiti, as well as in many other places.  It seemed to me that the
concept of torture had to apply to something that was seen as triv-
ial, just as very much of the suffering of people who had been sub-
jected to torture in the world—before the massive campaign that
NGOs [Non-Governmental Organizations] ran against torture—
was not understood as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. It was not
understood as the suffering generated by this horrendous act, not
only for those who had experienced it in their own bodies, but also
38 The Magistrate recommended $200,000 in damages for Dr. Filártiga and
$175,000 for Ms. Filártiga. See Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 861 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
39 Id. at 867 (awarding plaintiffs $10,385,364 in punitive damages).
40 Id.
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for those who are indirectly affected by it.  I think that the whole
experience of Filártiga, including the profound experience with
Dolly in this process, really taught me something I can’t let go of.  I
carry that with me and take it to other places where it’s useful.
MS. GAER: I want to turn back to John Huerta for a moment.
You’re in a different place now as General Counsel of the Smithso-
nian than you were in the Justice Department.  If you think about
the development of civil rights and multicultural understanding—
and how this country has developed with regard to civil rights
cases—were you surprised or disappointed in any way with the Fi-
lártiga decision?  How do you see the larger impact of the case?
And did you, in any way, foresee that the outcome would open the
kind of judicial doors that it has for subsequent clients with human
rights claims?
MR. HUERTA: I was a Center for Latin American Studies Fellow
at U.C. Berkeley when I was in law school, and after I graduated law
school I went to Peru for two years.  I was very much following de-
velopments in Latin America—the rise of other dictatorships there,
including the overthrow of [former Chilean President Salvador]
Allende.41  Therefore, I did see long-range implications of Filártiga
because I was aware, first, of the immigrant flow to the U.S. from
Latin America—my father immigrated to this country in 1922 from
Mexico—and I was aware that there were a lot of Salvadoran immi-
grants based on the situation in El Salvador.42  I had also traveled
to speak on international human rights issues in Mexico, Peru, and
Paraguay.  I was invited to speak in Paraguay by the Colorado Party,
which is not Stroessner’s party, shortly after we filed our amicus
brief in Filártiga.  I spoke before the bar association there in a very
small facility about a fourth the size of this room with a group of
about this size.  I went to explain why the United States took this
position, that torture of Paraguayan citizens was of concern to
United States courts.  One of the questions I got was, “If you don’t
torture people, how could you ever convict someone in a criminal
matter?” So that shows you the attitude.  It was a phenomenon I
can talk about for a long time; it was essentially an out-of-this-world
41 See Associated Press, Junta in Charge: State of Siege Decreed by Military Chiefs—Curfew
Imposed, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 12, 1973, at A1.
42 From 1980 through 1991, El Salvador was engulfed in a violent civil war between
the right-wing military dictatorship and a leftist rebel group.  Both military “death
squads” and insurgents executed thousands of civilians.  U.N. Sec. Council, From Mad-
ness to Hope: The 12-year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on the Truth for El
Salvador, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (1993), available at http://www.usip.org/library/tc/doc/
reports/el_ salvador/tc_es_03151993_toc.html.
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experience.  These were people who wanted to know—I think they
were sympathetic, but they were afraid to ask questions, so a lot of
them spoke in hypotheticals.
About the decision, I was hopeful.  I was very happy.  I was
more worried about the precedent that Mr. Weiss referred to—
Dreyfus43—but I knew they had two fairly recent cases, both of
which were not good precedents.  The Second Circuit had to over-
come those opinions, so I was very happy when it did.44  Then, with
the Supreme Court becoming more conservative over the years, I
followed the case somewhat.  When the Supreme Court decided
Sosa, I was just thrilled.45  I didn’t really expect that result out of
the Court.
MS. GAER: Thank you. I want to ask Peter:  You’ve continued to
be involved in other initiatives to make human rights violators ac-
countable, to use this law, and to pursue universal jurisdiction.
Can you tell us if you were surprised by the decision, or by the
judgment, or the compensation?  What do you feel has been this
case’s effect on international law generally?
MR. WEISS: We weren’t so surprised by the decision, which by
the way took a long time—about six months—to come down be-
cause the people in the State and Justice Departments were busy
with the Iran hostage situation.46  I wasn’t surprised because I was
totally convinced that we were right, but I was still elated.  It was a
wonderful decision.  It’s fair to say that the Filártiga case has been
cited more often in human rights litigation than any other case—
and there have been hundreds and hundreds of citations. More
than one hundred law journal articles have been written about it.
It was important not only for the narrow issue before the court, but
in a larger way.
Let me tell you what Anne-Marie Slaughter, former president
of the American Society of International Law, said in article she
wrote.  She said, “[T]he Alien Tort Statute cases have . . . forced
U.S. courts to grapple with developments in international law that
might otherwise have received little attention—a much-needed
tonic for a judicial system often lamentably out of touch with inter-
43 Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
44 Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
45 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
46 See Bernard Gwertzman, Reagan Takes Oath as 40th President; Promises an “Era Of
National Renewal”—Minutes Later, 52 U.S. Hostages in Iran Fly to Freedom After 444-Day
Ordeal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1981, at A1; Associated Press, Significant Dates in the Hostage
Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1981, at A7.
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national law.”47
The Court of Appeals decision made a number of very impor-
tant points that have remained basically unreversed.  One had to
do with how to interpret international documents like the U.N.
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.48  The
Circuit Court said that the U.N. Charter, which is a treaty of the
United States, makes clear in this modern age that “a state’s treat-
ment of its own citizens is a matter of international concern.”49
That was the first time a court ever said that, and the particular
part is the protection of citizens from being subjected to torture.50
If you ask anyone in an official position in Washington these days,
they say “U.N. resolutions?  Forget it, they mean nothing.”  This
court, however, said that they have a legal value and they create
customary law.  These days Washington says, “What is customary
law?  Nobody knows.”  That’s how far away from the Filártiga teach-
ings we have come.  Also, it brings in the question:  What is an act
of state?  The court said, in passing, that it doubted “whether ac-
tion by a state official in violation of the Constitution and laws of
the Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation’s
government, could properly be characterized as an act of state.”51
What has this brought, then?  It has brought, in my opinion,
an explosive development of a jurisprudence of universal jurisdic-
tion.  Not every country around the world is as litigious as the
United States; not every country seeks to redress torts through civil
actions; many other countries go the criminal way.  There’s a very
interesting article by Beth Stephens, who used to be with CCR and
is now a professor at Rutgers-Camden School of Law, called Trans-
lating Filártiga, which takes a comparative-law view of the Filártiga
decision and points out how other countries take a more criminal
approach to these types of wrongs.52
In terms of asserting universal jurisdiction, people tend to
think of the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has its first
47 Anne-Marie Slaughter & David Bosco, Plaintiff’s Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Sept./Oct. 2000, at 106.
48 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
49 Filártiga,  630 F.2d at 881.
50 Id. at 882–84 (citing Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), at 91, U.N.Doc. A/1034 (Dec. 9, 1975)).
51 Id. at 889.
52 Beth Stephens, Translating Filártiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis
of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 1
(2002).
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case, the Darfur case—which the United States reluctantly agreed
to send to the ICC despite its strong opposition to the court.53  I
want to very quickly run through developments of universal juris-
diction.  There was an arrest warrant issued in London for a pro-
spective Israeli war criminal, who, upon arrival in England, decided
to immediately get on a plane and go back to Israel [to avoid ar-
rest].54  However, an Afghan warlord has been found guilty in the
United Kingdom for acts committed in Afghanistan in July 2005.55
In the Netherlands, in the summer of 2005, two Afghan journalists
who had been granted asylum were exposed by Afghan refugees as
members of the Taliban and charged with committing torture.56
They were tried in a Dutch court, and sentenced to eight and
twelve years in a Dutch prison.57  In Spain, a former Argentine
Navy officer, who admitted to having participated in taking people
who had been arrested under the junta on airplane rides and
dumping them into the ocean, was tried in early 2005 and sen-
tenced to spend the rest of his life in a Spanish prison.58  In May
2005, Spain’s Constitutional Court—which sits over the Supreme
Court there—reversed the Supreme Court and ruled that the court
could assert jurisdiction over war criminals even when Spanish citi-
zens were not victims, saying that the principle of universal jurisdic-
tion takes precedence over national interests.59  All this confirms
my theory of history: It proceeds simultaneously in opposite
directions.
MS. GAER: Thank you. I want to ask Rhonda to comment on
53 Marlise Simons, Sudan Poses First Big Trial For World Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 2005, at A12.  The Bush Administration withdrew the United States from the
treaty establishing the ICC and has opposed the court’s jurisdiction over Americans.
Id.  “After two months of opposition and diplomatic wrangling, the Security Council
was only able to refer the Darfur crisis to the [ICC] because the United States agreed
to abstain, rather than cast its veto.” Id. See also International Criminal Court: Darfur,
Sudan, http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/Darfur.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2006).
54 Vikram Dodd & Conal Urquhart, Israeli Evades Arrest at Heathrow over Army War
Crime Allegations, GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2005, at 5, available at http://www.guardian.co.
uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1568001,00.html.  Doron Almog, retired Israeli Major Gen-
eral, remained on his plane at Heathrow airport until it flew back to Israel after learn-
ing he would be arrested upon disembarking.
55 See Sandra Laville, UK Court Convicts Afghan Warlord, GUARDIAN, July 19, 2005, at
2, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/afghanistan/story/0,,1531456,00.html.
56 See Marlise Simons, Two Afghans Face Dutch War-Crimes Charges from 80’s Soviet Era,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2005, at A13.
57 Marlise Simons, Prison for Afghan War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2005, at A6.
58 SAN, Apr. 19, 2005 (S.A.N., No. 16); see also Renwick McLean, Argentine Officer
Convicted, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2005, at A8.
59 STC, Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237), available at http://www.tribunalconstitu-
cional.es/jurisprudencia/Stc2005/STC2005-237.html.
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how the findings in these kind of cases have expanded:  Are we still
dealing with mostly torture cases or is there now something differ-
ent in cases?
PROFESSOR COPELON: I am going to answer this really fast.  I
think there are three ways.  The Filártiga principle has been utilized
for twenty-four years in cases in this country.  There have been a
number of groups that have grown up as a consequence of this,
and we’ve all worked together in different ways on a series of cases.
The first includes a series of cases involving state actors:  The
development went from Peña, a direct torturer—who was clearly a
high-trained person although low-level—to major issues of com-
mand responsibility and superior responsibility for those who were
not directly involved in the violations but bear responsibility by vir-
tue of their power and authority.  That is the series of cases that has
been going on for the last twenty-four years.60
Another important expansion consistent with the evolution of
international law is the expansion in relation to private actors.
There were early cases involving war crimes:  The major case most
people are familiar with involved a Bosnia-Serbian leader, where
the Second Circuit wrote a brilliant decision insisting upon the ap-
plication of this principle to war crimes and non-state private ac-
tors.61  That concept opens the door for holding armed groups
responsible for their conduct. We used the principle against an
armed Islamic group in Algeria when no one else was paying much
attention to Algeria.62
Finally, the third really significant development has been in
utilizing Filártiga and the Alien Tort Claims Act63 [against] viola-
tions by corporations where they have committed violations that,
under international law, can be committed by private actors: sup-
porting war crimes, supporting crimes against humanity, support-
60 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding torture of
Ethiopian prisoners by the leader of a local government unit under Ethiopian military
dictatorship in the 1970s); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.
1994) (torture, execution, and disappearance of Filipino citizens by former President
of the Phillipines); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (suing for-
mer Guatemalan Minister of Defense for acts of torture and violence perpetrated by
Guatemalan armed forces).
61 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e hold that certain
forms of conduct violate the law of nations whether undertaken by those acting under
the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.”).
62 See Doe v. Islamic Salvation Front, 257 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 (D.D.C. 2003)
(granting defendant Anwar Haddam’s motion for summary judgment because of lack
of evidence connecting him to terror and violence suffered by plaintiffs); see also Bob
Herbert, Terrorism by the Book, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1997, at § 4, p. 9.
63 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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ing state violations.64
MS. GAER: As Rhonda stated earlier, we are going to hear from
Ralph Steinhardt and Sandra Coliver from the Center for Justice
and Accountability.  Ralph will begin first.  He is at George Wash-
ington University Law School and was the counsel for the Sosa case,
which was the Filártiga-type case that went to the Supreme Court
recently.65  There has been a lot of pressure from the government
to challenge its constitutionality and to eliminate this jurisdiction.
Could you comment on the Supreme Court’s decision?  Where is
the opposition to ATCA coming from?  What is their argument?
What is its future?  Can ATCA be kept alive?
RALPH STEINHARDT: In many respects, I’m the token here,
since I represent the legions of lawyers and plaintiffs who have re-
lied on the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Filártiga case.  I was a
second-year law student and a summer associate at a law firm when
the Filártiga case was being litigated, and I worked on the smallest
corner of a tiny little amicus brief that went to the International
Human Rights Law Group—but it changed my life.  It was an inter-
esting set of ideas and energies.  I felt as though I had tapped into
a huge vein of possibility.  It has kept me going for almost a quarter
of a century.
In the immediate aftermath of the decision, there were proba-
bly more academic conferences on Alien Tort Claims Act cases
than there were cases, and there were a great deal more people on
the panels than there were in the audience.  As time went on, how-
ever, there was an expansion of actual claims for wrongs, including
genocide, slavery, war crimes, crimes against humanity, human traf-
64 See, e.g., Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 122 (2d Cir. 2001) (defen-
dant corporation allegedly violated international law by virtue of conduct leading up
to Indian toxic gas disaster), aff’d, 2006 WL 2336428 (2d Cir. 2006); Bigio v. Coca-
Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 444 (2d Cir. 2000) (defendant corporation knowingly pur-
chased property that was acquired unlawfully on the basis of religious discrimination),
rev’d, 448 F.3d 176 (2d Cir. 2006); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1120 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (defendant corporation accused of war crimes, human rights violations,
racial discrimination, inflicting environmental harm, and causing civil war to island),
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 456 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006); Aguinda v.
Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470, 473 (2d Cir. 2002) (defendant corporation allegedly vio-
lated international law by polluting rain forests and rivers in Ecuador and Peru);
Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 92 (2d Cir. 2000) (defendant corpo-
ration allegedly imprisoned and tortured plaintiffs in retaliation against their political
opposition to defendant’s oil exploration activities); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424, 432 (D.N.J. 1999) (defendant corporation allegedly committed war
crimes and human rights violations when it profited from use of forced labor in Nazi
Germany).
65 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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ficking, terrorism, consular access for people facing the death pen-
alty, and environmental torts.
We also had an expansion of the class of defendants, which
brought on much of the current opposition to the Alien Tort
Claims Act.  For example, one case going to the Second Circuit this
January on behalf of victims of apartheid in South Africa has
caused unrest among corporations because of its expanded theory
of liability.66  One part of the theory of liability suggests that if you
do business in a bad place at a bad time, you could be violating the
rule of nations.  Other parts suggest that corporations bear respon-
sibility under the law of nations if they are complicit in the human
rights violations of the government with which they do business.  In
short, the theory is that where corporations engage in joint ven-
tures with governments that involve violations of human rights for
profit, they can be held liable for those human rights violations.
There are some crimes that don’t require state action at all.
The definition of “genocide” in Article 4 of the Genocide Conven-
tion makes it clear that private entities acting alone can violate
prohibitions against genocide.67  If we had a corporation that was
making poison gas for the destruction of Jews in a concentration
camp or a corporation that was a front for a piracy ring or slave
trafficking ring, there is not much doubt that  such a corporation
would face liability, even where state action was not present.  I
think that the set of cases now pending, like Khulumani, where the
corporations face liability because they are enmeshed with a gov-
ernment that has violated human rights, present a more intriguing
theory of liability and can also reach a broader class of defendants.
The class of plaintiffs bringing Alien Tort Claims Act claims
has also expanded.  Instead of having courageous individual plain-
tiffs, like the Filártigas, many cases are being brought as class ac-
tions or by NGOs.
Perhaps the most important development is that cases under
the Alien Tort Claim Act have moved from default judgments to
full-scale trials.  This means that there will be pretrial motions, evi-
dentiary rulings, and actual awards of damages.  As an aside, I have
to say that very few of my clients expect damages or really think
that damages will make them whole.  One of my Filipino clients was
66 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., No. 05-2141-cv (2d Cir. argued Jan. 24, 2006).
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdic-
tion in In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 543 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
67 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 4,
Jan. 12, 1951, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
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gang-raped at a police station and was told that she was everybody’s
girlfriend.  When we brought a case challenging Marcos’s govern-
ment for creating a climate of impunity in which this torture was
acceptable and expected to occur, we got a huge judgment on pa-
per.68  I said, “There’s a decent chance that you may never see a
dime.”  She said—and I’ll never forget this—“It’s enough to be be-
lieved!”  Even if plaintiffs don’t see the actual money, I think the
fact that we can now have a full-scale trial and the actual award of
damages is extremely significant.
In recent years, a significant challenge for plaintiffs under
ATCA was battling a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the
Act put forward in 1984 in Judge Robert Bork’s concurring opin-
ion in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.69  Bork stated that wrongs
recognizable under ATCA should be limited to those recognized in
the late eighteenth century—for example, piracy and attacks on
diplomats.70  He also argued that the Alien Tort Claims Act could
not create a private right of action.71
This restrictive interpretation was kicked around in a number
of cases in the 1980s and 1990s and eventually reached the United
States Supreme Court in the petitioners’ brief in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain.72  That case involved the abduction of a Mexican doctor
[Alavarez-Machain] by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
under the theory that he had been involved in the frightful torture
and murder of a DEA agent and his pilot in Mexico.  The govern-
ment of Mexico had cooperated in investigating the agent’s killers
but did not go after Alvarez-Machain.  The DEA, allegedly in an
operation authorized by the regional office in Los Angeles, hired
former Mexican federales to kidnap the doctor from Mexico and
bring him to Texas to be arrested.  Alvarez-Machain challenged his
indictment, arguing that his abduction was in violation of the treaty
between U.S. and Mexico, and the [criminal] case went to the U.S.
Supreme Court for the first time in 1992.73  The Supreme Court
held there was no explicit prohibition on kidnapping in the extra-
dition treaty, and therefore that it must be lawful.74  Of course the
68 The jury awarded $1.2 billion in exemplary damages and $766 million in com-
pensatory damages. Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 772 (9th Cir. 1996).
69 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 813–16.
71 Id. at 817–19.
72 Brief of Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339),
at 16-20, 2004 WL 162761.
73 United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992).
74 Id. at 668–69.
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rules of Monopoly do not say that you cannot rob the bank, but I
would assume most of us would know that that is not okay.  In any
event, he was then put on trial and acquitted in a directed
verdict.75
After his acquittal, Alvarez-Machain brought an Alien Tort
Claims Act suit against his kidnappers in which we represented
him.76  When the case went to the Supreme Court, we were con-
cerned that the U.S. government and corporations which thought
the Alien Tort Claims Act was out of control would push Bork’s
restrictive approach.
At the end of the day, the Supreme Court ruled that the Alien
Tort Claims Act furnished jurisdiction for only a relatively modest
set of actions alleging violations of the rules of nations.77  It then
articulated a rule of evidence for assessing whether claims were
proper under Alien Tort Claim Act.78  It said that any claim based
on the current law of nations must rest on a norm of international
character accepted by a “civilized world”—and we all know who
that excludes—and must be defined with the specificity compara-
ble to the eighteenth century paradigms we have recognized under
the law of nations.79  These eighteenth century paradigms refer in-
ter alia to the actions of a man who took his cane and tripped a
French diplomat on the streets of Philadelphia, creating a huge
diplomatic controversy.80  Presumably then, if there are current vi-
olations of the current law of nations at that level, they will be rec-
ognized under the Alien Tort Claims Act.  This standard sounds
funny, but the fact is that U.S. courts have always been able to dis-
tinguish bogus claims from legitimate ones—which is why we now
have an actual core that includes genocide and crimes against hu-
manity, but does not include a right if you won the New York State
lottery to get your award in a lump sum rather than an annuity.  In
fact that was one of the claims that was put forward under the
75 See Alvarez-Machain v. United States, No. CV 93-4072 JGD (JHx), 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21702, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 1995), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 107 F.3d 696
(9th Cir. 1997).  The district judge granted Alvarez’s motion for acquittal on Decem-
ber 14, 1992 because the government lacked sufficient evidence to support a guilty
verdict; more than thirty-two months after his abduction, Alvarez was released. Id.
76 The Supreme Court eventually heard the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542
U.S. 692 (2004).
77 Id. at 712, 724–25.
78 Id. at 725.
79 Id.
80 Respublica v. DeLongchamps, 1 U.S. 111 [1 Dall. 111; 1 L. Ed. 59] (1784).  The
scandal was known as the Marbois incident; the French minister threatened to leave
Pennsylvania if there was not a satisfactory outcome in the case. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at
717 n.11.
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ATCA and lost; it lost because there is no right under international
law to receive a lottery award in a lump sum.81  So the courts have
been able to distinguish the good from the bogus cases.  Nonethe-
less, we were quite concerned that some of the systematic attacks
on the statute would prevail: That it contains no cause of action;
that it intrudes on the domain and discretion of the executive
branch; or that it is an open invitation for judicial activism.
Sosa was a mixed victory: It was a victory for human rights activ-
ists in the sense that escaping the great fire was a victory in itself.
Everybody in the world, except me, thinks they won.  The corpo-
rate side feels it got a rhetoric of caution instructing lower courts
that the door is left only slightly ajar for these cases to go forward;
on the other hand, the human rights community thinks it won the
case because the Alien Tort Claims Act was not read out of exis-
tence.  I, on the other hand, had a client to represent, and I’m
pretty sure he lost.82
Still, the only lower court decision that the Supreme Court dis-
approved was Alvarez-Machain.83  It cited with approval Filártiga,84
Karadzic,85 Marcos,86 and a number of others, all of which suggested
that the argument that [ATCA] was an awakening monster, in the
words of some of its opponents, was over the top; and that you
could trust the courts of the United States to distinguish the weak
from the strong claims.  At the end of the day then, Sosa reinforced
the doctrine that the law of nations was part of our law and re-
jected the most systematic attacks on the reach of the Alien Tort
Claims Act.
I will comment briefly on the Feinstein legislation.  In October
2005, Senator Dianne Feinstein of California introduced a bill
called the Alien Tort Statute Reform Act,87 which many human
rights activists believe would eviscerate [ATCA].  Within two days of
81 Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam).  The court
called the lawsuit an “unusually frivolous . . . action” and declined jurisdiction under
ATCA, which only applied to “shockingly egregious violations of universally recog-
nized principles of international law.” Id.
82 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737–38 (finding that the facts alleged by Sosa regarding his
kidnapping and arbitrary detention were not specific enough to be called a violation
of binding customary international law).
83 Id. at 699 (reversing Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir.
2003)).
84 Id. at 725, 731, 732, 738 n.29 (citing Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980)).
85 Id. at 733 n.20 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995)).
86 Id. at 732 (citing In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467
(9th Cir. 1994)).
87 S. 1874, 109th Cong. (2005).
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the bill’s introduction, human rights activists met with Senator
Feinstein to point out the most unfortunate aspects of this legisla-
tion.  They wanted to spell out to her the difference between what
she said on the floor of the legislature and the likely effect of the
law.  She then informally withdrew the bill by asking the Chair of
the Judiciary Committee, Senator Arlen Specter, not to schedule a
hearing.  She stated, “I believe the present legislation calls for re-
finement in light of concerns raised by human rights activists.”
It seems to me that the Senator’s failure to find co-sponsors
for the bill makes analysis of the bill unnecessary. But I think it is a
mistake to dismiss the key question that animated the proposal:
Whether the district courts have the expertise and the doctrinal
understanding of international law to distinguish legitimate cases.
Feinstein wanted to give greater voice to the executive branch in
derailing these cases, but she realized there was too much politics
involved.  I don’t think any folks will get anywhere in reforming
ATCA without the support of the human rights community.
MS. GAER: Sandy Coliver is an active litigator who has been
working from a concept that recognizes that litigation is also part
of the healing process for victims of torture. Sandy, can you fill us
in on the concept of victims of torture and how litigation is part of
the healing process—and how compensation is part of it?  Sandy
has recently been the director of the Center for Justice and Ac-
countability.  She’s now here in New York working with the Justice
Initiative.  I wonder if you could summarize the effect of these
cases and what difference they have made.
SANDRA COLIVER: Thank you, Felice.  I will speak briefly and
my remarks will be a tribute to the Filártigas.  The Center for Jus-
tice and Accountability was just one of the most recent organiza-
tions formed to carry forward the precedent established by the
Filártigas and their legal team.  Ralph Steinhardt was active with
Amnesty International, recognizing that there wasn’t an organiza-
tion dedicated to using the Filártiga precedent against individual
perpetrators.  I want to also thank Earthrights International, which
is using the Alien Tort Claims Act and Filártiga in the Unocal case.88
It’s hard to say in a few words, but let me give you some num-
88 Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (2002), vacated, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005)
(en banc) (granting parties’ stipulated motion to dismiss and settling the case). See
also Press Release, Earthrights International, Final Settlement Reached in Doe v. Uno-
cal (March 21, 2005), available at http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/final_set-
tlement_reached_in_doe_v._unocal.html; Press Release, Earthrights International,
Historic Advance for Universal Human Rights: Unocal to Compensate Burmese Vil-
lagers (April 2, 2005) available at http://www.earthrights.org/legalfeature/historic_
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bers, as well as a few stories.  Since Peña was held accountable, six-
teen more individuals have been brought to justice from twelve
different countries.  Those countries—you may have heard about
some of the more high-profile cases—are of a wide range.  They
are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Venezuela,
Bosnia, Ghana, Rwanda, Ethiopia, the Philippines, and Indone-
sia.89  Each of these cases was a mini-truth commission.  Each of
them represented survivors and the families of victims from many
generations.
Defendants in these cases included top perpetrators.  One was
[former Bosnian Serb leader Radovan] Karadzic, a sitting leader of
a paramilitary state.90  There were two former heads of state and
three former ministers of defense.91  This active precedent is now
being used against corporations and against our own Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a case brought by the Center for Con-
stitutional Rights.92  Individual cases have established that ministers
of defense from foreign countries can be held responsible when
the evidence establishes their command responsibility.
These cases have clearly had an impact on deterring human
rights abusers from coming to this country.  Following the Filártiga
decision, researchers found there was a drop in requests for visas
from Paraguay, as well as a drop in the issuing of such visas.  It did
send a message to the consulates to be more careful about issuing
visas.  Beyond that, the survivors from countries that were targeted
by the active cases reported that abusers from their countries were
no longer coming to the United States; no longer coming to visit
such places as Disneyland and San Diego.  Communities in South
Florida, for example, have said they were all now on the lookout
advance_for_universal_human_rights_unocal_to_compensate_burmese_villagers.
html.
89 See, e.g., Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006) (El Salvador);
Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005) (Chile); Abebe-Jira v.
Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996) (Ethiopia); Kadic v. Karadzic, 74 F.3d 377 (2d
Cir. 1996) (Bosnia); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Phillipines); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (Guatemala);
Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987), reconsideration granted in
part by, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (Argentina).
90 Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
91 Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2006) (two former defense ministers of
El Salvador); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir.1994) (former
president of the Phillipines); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995)
(former defense minister of Guatemala).
92 See Rasul v. Rumsfeld, 414 F. Supp. 2d 26, 28 (D.D.C. 2006) (dismissing claims
under ATCA, FTCA, and constitutional claims on the basis of defendants’ immunity);
see also Ex-Guantánamo Inmate Files Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at A10.
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for the visiting human rights violators.  Indeed, there was a state-
ment issued by retired military leaders from El Salvador stating that
they felt persecuted because they could no longer travel to the
United States.
There was a case that CCR brought against Hector Gramajo
Morales, who had been the top general of Guatemala.93  He de-
cided to transform himself into a civilian leader; to get himself
ready to become president of Guatemala, he went to the Kennedy
School at Harvard.94  On his graduation day, he was served with a
complaint by the CCR.95  He then returned to Guatemala and his
party no longer wanted him as their lead candidate because, in
order to be the president of Guatemala, you need to be able to
come to the United States without embarrassment—and that was
made impossible by the lawsuit.
A final case I want to mention was a successful case brought in
2002 against two El Salvadoran former ministers of defense—top
generals in the Junta.96  One of our clients in the case, Carlos Mau-
ricio, had the privilege to meet Dolly Filártiga at the press confer-
ence for the Sosa decision.  He said that it was a wonderful
experience.  It was the culmination of his involvement overcoming
terror and imposed silence, which was the impact and the intended
impact of the torture.  Having heard the numbers and the jurispru-
dence of the cases, the tremendous impact of these cases is the fact
that they can give back voices to people who had their voices inten-
tionally taken away.  The main impact of torture is the terror to the
community.
Carlos right now is leading a caravan to Fort Benning.  He will
be stopping in Memphis at another ATCA trial against another Sal-
vadoran perpetrator.  After the decision in his case was rendered in
2002, we received a letter from the Dean of the University of San
Francisco, a Jesuit institution, inviting us to come and observe the
anniversary of the death of the Jesuit priests who had been killed
93 Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 202 (D. Mass. 1995) (awarding plaintiffs
$47.5 million in compensatory and punitive damages after default judgment).
94 Tim Golden, Controversy Pursues Guatemalan General Studying in U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 3, 1990, at A6.
95 Neil A. Lewis, Suing Dictators (and Similar Types) Here for Violations Committed Else-
where, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at B8.
96 See Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding district
court’s award of $54,600,000 against defendants Jose Garcia and Carlos Vides Casa-
nova).  Garcia was minister of defense and Casanova director general of the national
guard from 1979 to 1983; after Garcia resigned in 1983, Casanova became minister of
defense until his resignation in 1989. Id.
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on November 16, 1989 in El Salvador.97  For thirteen years that
tragedy had been observed with sadness and anger, but for the first
time, that year, they could observe it with the possibility of justice.
That is what these cases bring; that is what the Filártigas have
brought to us; and that is what these lawyers have made possible.
MS. GAER: Thank you, Sandy. Thanks to all the panelists.  Now,
I’d like to give the attorney the privilege of introducing the clients.
PROFESSOR COPELON: I think we were all moved last week when
Rosa Parks’s body lay in state in the nation’s capital.98  Rosa Parks
said that when she refused to give up her seat on the bus, Emmett
Till was on her mind.  Emmett Till was the young African-American
boy from Chicago who, while visiting family in Mississippi, was said
to have whistled at a white woman and, as a result, was brutally
tortured and murdered.99  His body was finally retrieved by the au-
thorities and returned to Chicago.  The government of Mississippi
said that under no circumstance should the casket be opened.  But
Mamie Till, Emmett’s mother, insisted upon opening it.  And when
Mamie Till opened it—and what she saw was a brutally tortured
child—she took pictures.  She insisted that there be an open casket
at the funeral and that her son be shown to the world.  And she
said: “Everyone has to see this; we’re going to pull the lid off
Mississippi.”
When I heard that story, it was the story of the Filártigas. It was
the story of what they did in the midst of Stroessner’s regime of
terror, just like Mamie Till did in the midst of the whites’ terror in
Mississippi.  They took pictures. They took this beloved body, and
they laid it in their house; like in Chicago, hundreds of people
risked their own lives to come and bear witness to what had hap-
pened.  The courage of this family to do what they did is extraordi-
nary.  It is the courage of this family that brought us the Filártiga
case.  It is part of the thread of the demand for social justice that
has existed through history.
In particular, I think this case would not have happened if it
were not for Dolly Filártiga.  When she miraculously discovered
where Peña was living in Brooklyn, by the fact that a letter was sent
to the Filártiga household,100 Dolly Filártiga said, “I must go to New
97 Lindsey Gruson, Six Priests Killed in a Campus Raid in San Salvador, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 1989, at A1.
98 Janofsky, supra note 15. R
99 See Shalia Dewan, How Photos Became Icon of Civil Rights Movement, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2005, at A12.
100 See Selwyn Raab, Paraguay Alien Tied to Murders in Native Land, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5,
1979, at B1.
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York and find him.”  And she took her father with her.
She stayed here and sat with us through the pain of making
affidavits for the case, through all the processes of the case,
through all of its uncertainties.  She did that.  She did that because,
like Rosa Parks, she wasn’t going to take it sitting down.  Some-
thing moved history in Dolly Filártiga, and it’s that courage, that
demand, that spirit that she brings to us and every other person
that uses the Filártiga case.  With that, I’d like to introduce Dolly
Filártiga.
MS. FILÁRTIGA: Thank you very much.  I did not imagine that
we would accomplish the whole thing, you know.  I just came here
to find Peña, to look at him and ask him why he had to kill my
brother.  And what the Center for Constitutional Rights gave me
that we were able to have trust in not only us, but in other cases
that they were claiming, is unbelievable.  I was twenty when they
killed my brother.  I was a student of medicine. . . .  There is cer-
tainly a moment where—rapidly your life changes completely.  I’m
living in another country; you don’t know what to do.  I met
Rhonda and Peter through my mother, and they changed my life.
They tell me to—do you mind if I just keep quiet for awhile and let
him talk and then continue?
MR. WEISS: I would like to introduce Dr. Joel Filártiga.  First, I
would like to quickly mention all the things he will not tell you—
about the threats on his life; the attempts on his life; about how his
lawyer was disbarred in Paraguay.  As you can see, there are a cer-
tain amount of genes that Dolly got from her father.  He is an
amazing man.  He is a doctor.  He runs a clinic in Paraguay for
poor people.  He is an artist, a poet, a renaissance fighter for jus-
tice. We are here to honor him.
DR. FILÁRTIGA [TRANSLATED FROM SPANISH]: We lost a son in a
horrible situation.  We lost a son in a terrible situation.  And yet far,
far within the same continent we find great brothers and great
friends.  Extraordinary fighters for justice.  Because crime and in-
justice does not have a territory, it does not have a nationality.  Tor-
ture is the highest sin.  Torture has no territory.  It is an eternal
and horrendous crime.  We feel it in our spirits as if it were today.
We live it every moment.  We are living it with each moment.
It’s important that this great country not allow more torture.
That there are no more Abu Ghraibs,101 no more Guantánamos.102
101 Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, In Abuse, a Portrayal of Ill-Prepared, Overwhelmed
G.I.’s, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2004, at A1; James Risen, G.I.’s Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi
Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A15.
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That there is no longer that monstrous virus that is torture.
Right now there are other indirect ways of torture.  Thousands
of workers are dying in my country, intoxicated by agrotoxics that
are being used in differential ways: There are 40,000 liters, 18,000,
20,000 liters per year of pesticides used in a country of only six
million inhabitants.  These pesticides destroy the brainwaves.  Two
people per day commit suicide in Paraguay.  Three people per day
die of cancer.  We have a sick country, miserable because the im-
proper cultivation of soy has devastated our forests. Paraguay was
an earthly paradise.  It was a Mesopotamia with two enormous riv-
ers—the Paraguay and the Paraná.  Today there are no more for-
ests.  Because there are no more forests, there is no more rain.
The Paraguay river is a nest of water right now.  The climate has
changed completely.  There are no more birds.  The Guyra Cam-
pana, the bell bird that was born in Paraguay, no longer exists be-
cause there are no more forests.
Not only were Paraguayans tortured, our Paraguayan land is
being tortured right this moment.  We are the fourth producer of
soy in the world—what a pity.  We don’t have birds, we don’t have
water, we don’t have good health, our workers don’t have any more
land.  And the city centers create delinquents—Paraguayans can’t
go out when there is no light out.  This is a problem of massive
proportions that my country is struggling with now.
102 Eric Schmitt & Tim Golden, Force-Feeding at Guantánamo Is Now Acknowledged,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2006, at A6; Warren Hoge, Investigators for U.N. Urge U.S. to Close
Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A6.
